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must occur regardless of whether or not any children presently are placed with the
carer.
F. CONCLUSION
Armes is a significant decision. It means that acts of abuse in ordinary domestic or
social environments may, depending on the degree of integration of the perpetrator
into its “business”, render a defendant vicariously liable. While one cannot doubt that
the result is a “fair, just, and reasonable” one, the analysis seems to be complicated
by reliance on the full suite of the Christian Brothers factors. Nevertheless, using
Armes’s touchstones of integration and control, this note suggests that the imposition
of vicarious liability in Scotland is a likely consequence of the local authority’s decision
to place a child with a foster carer.
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Abandonment of Land and the Scottish Coal Case:
was it Unprecedented?
A. INTRODUCTION
Owners of land do not usually wish to abandon it. Land is scarce and is normally
a valuable commodity. It seems strange that there might be circumstances where
someone would seek to relinquish a slice of Scotland in exchange for no benefit.
Notwithstanding, the liquidators of a landowner recently tried to do this in relation
to certain sites that had been used for coal mining. In the Scottish Coal case,1 those
liquidators petitioned the Court of Session for guidance as to whether it was possible
to abandon land and, if so, the proper procedure for doing so. It was ultimately held
that it was not competent to abandon land in Scots law.
As we shall see, the case prompted some useful contemporary commentary, which
this note will develop. It will also seek to analyse one specific and as yet unaddressed
point raised in the course of proceedings. Both the Outer and Inner Houses
recognised that there was a distinct lack of authority as regards the abandonment
of land. As Lord Hodge stated, “Counsel were not able to find any authority which
supported the idea that an owner could abandon land in Scotland”.2 Likewise, the
Inner House observed the “simple fact” that “no-one in the court was aware of any
1 The Scottish Environment Protection Agency and Others v The Joint Liquidators of the Scottish Coal
Company Ltd [2013] CSIH 108, 2014 SC 372 (“Scottish Coal CSIH”); Joint Liquidators of the Scottish
Coal Co Ltd, Noters [2013] CSOH 124, 2013 SLT 1055 (hereafter “Scottish Coal CSOH”).
2 Scottish Coal CSOH para 22.
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instance in which a person (corporate or otherwise) had “abandoned” or “disclaimed”
heritable property, so as to render it ownerless”.3 This may seem surprising in a system
as developed as Scots law. After outlining the matters raised in the case, this note will
consider why the legal point had not arisen prior to the particular circumstances of
Scottish Coal, and highlight some issues for further consideration.
B. FACTS OF THE CASE
The Scottish Coal Company Limited owned sites used for open-cast mining in
Ayrshire, Lanarkshire and Fife. When the court ordered the winding up of the
company, the petitioners were appointed as joint liquidators. Several sites or part-
sites remained unsold. The cost of future compliance with environmental regulation
with regard to these sites was estimated to be around £478,000 per month.4 Such
costs would swallow up the assets of the Scottish Coal Company. In order to protect
unsecured creditors and the holders of a floating charge, the liquidators sought
direction from the court on several questions.
The question of central importance in this note was whether the liquidators could
disclaim (abandon) ownership of the land.5 If this was possible then the liquidators,
released from the environmental costs, would have some assets left to distribute
to the creditors. Due to the environmental damage and the ensuing costs (which
would still have to be met by someone) for any restoration or indeed to ensure the
aversion or mitigation of any further damage, various public bodies opposed the
liquidators.6 In the Outer House Lord Hodge concluded that the liquidators could
disclaim ownership of the sites. The Inner House (Lord Carloway, along with Lords
Brodie and Menzies) disagreed, holding that the heritable property could not be
abandoned.
C. TREATMENT OF ABANDONMENT OF LAND IN THE CASE
Abandonment was considered in the strict sense of casting away the real right of
ownership, not merely physically leaving or ceasing to use the land.7 Abandonment
3 Scottish Coal CSIH para 97.
4 The relevant environmental regulatory provisions were: the Water Environment (Controlled Activities)
(Scotland) Regulations 2005, SSI 2005/348; the Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland)
Regulations 2011, SSI 2011/209; and the Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2000,
SSI 2000/323.
5 For discussion of the insolvency related aspects of the case, see C Ingle, “Heritage regained” (2014)
59(3) J Law Soc Sc 32.
6 These were the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Scottish Natural Heritage, East Ayrshire and
South Lanarkshire Councils, and the Lord Advocate on behalf of the Scottish Ministers.
7 K Swinton, “Dealing with abandoned property” 2015 83(4) Scottish Law Gazette 64-65 highlights this
distinction. The usage of the word “abandoned” in part 3A of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003,
which gives a community the right to acquire land that is “wholly or mainly neglected or abandoned”,
poses some separate questions, but it seems clear that the word “abandoned” in that statute must have
a meaning other than the technical property law sense, not least because the scheme of the right to
acquire is predicated on acquiring from someone. This particular community right to buy is not yet in
force.
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in this legal sense seeks to end ownership by the unilateral action of the current owner
with no third party involvement.8
The novel character of the Scottish Coal case meant it attracted some attention.9
In the absence of specific Scots authority on the abandonment of land, Lord Hodge
(relying on the logic of Roman-Dutch law10 and German law11) concluded that
abandonment of land was possible in Scots law, being an essentially Civilian system
of ownership. He also drew an analogy with corporeal moveable property, but noted
that the procedure would need to be regulated by the court to prevent any abuse by
a landowner.12 The decision was overturned on appeal. The Inner House clarified
that the only ways ownership might end are actual destruction (say by coastal
erosion), dissolution of a company, the law operating to divest someone of land
(through diligence) or voluntary transfer. Abandonment of land in a strict sense is
not possible.13 “There is no legal process whereby a person can transfer land into
oblivion”.14
The Inner House did however agree with Lord Hodge that it seemed that the
Scottish Coal case was the first to address abandonment of land in Scots law. The
authors of this note have also been unable to find any prior authority. This dearth of
relevant case authority may be explained by several factors.
D. LACK OF PRECEDENT ON ABANDONMENT OF
OWNERSHIP OF LAND
(1) The feudal system
The feudal system of land tenure was ended on 28 November 2004 by the Abolition
of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000.15 Holders of the dominium utile in the
8 For non-Scots law commentary on this strict legal sense of abandonment, see further E Peñalver, “The
illusory right to abandon” (2010) 109MichLR 191; L J Strahilevitz, “The right to abandon” (2010) 158 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 355; R Hickey, “The problem of divesting abandonment” (2016) 80(1) The Conveyancer and
Property Lawyer 28; and R Cramer, “The abandonment of landownership in South African and Swiss
law” 2017 134 SALJ 870. See also D W Elliot “Land without an owner” (1954) 70 LQR 25.
9 K Swinton, “The ability to abandon title to land: SEPA v Scottish Coal” 2014 Scottish Law Gazette 16; C
Ingle (n 5); Swinton (n 7); K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2013 (2014) 196-199. Academic
coverage of land abandonment prior to this case was largely restricted to textbooks, most notably W M
Gordon and S Wortley, Scottish Land Law, 3rd edn vol 1 (2009) paras 13-19-13-22.
10 The major South African authority is contained in the case of Minister van Landbou v Sonnendecker
1979 (2) SA 944, and see now Cramer (n 8).
11 § 928 BGB.
12 “In summary, I consider that it may be possible for an owner to abandon land [. . .] I see no reason
in principle why this should not be the case. If it is possible to abandon corporeal moveable property,
it should be possible to abandon land. But in the absence of a statutory regime, it seems to me that
the court should regulate such abandonment to prevent its abuse as a means of avoiding obligations”:
Scottish Coal CSOH para 26. That procedure was found in paras 72-76.
13 Scottish Coal CSIH paras 101-102.
14 Ibid para 103 per Lord Carloway.
15 Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000 s 1. See further K G C Reid, The Abolition of
Feudal Tenure in Scotland (2003).
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land – being at the lowest level of the feudal hierarchy, but with practical control of the
land – became owners under a regime of simple ownership, removing the crown from
its apex role as dominium eminens.16 The comparatively recent abolition of feudalism
may explain the lack of cases prior to 2013, for the following reasons.
(a) Abandonment in a feudal system did not create a vacuum
If the dominium utile was abandoned the title would revert up the feudal chain.
The law developed so that where the abandonment was public the Crown took
priority over the immediate feudal superior (the dominium directum) and received
the dominium utile.17 Meanwhile, consolidation allowed the holder of the dominium
directum to acquire the dominium utile through resignation ad remanentiam18 or
via prescription, depending on the factual situation. Positive prescription allows
possessors of land to obtain title to it in certain circumstances, including the passage
of a defined time period in possession (forty years in terms of the Prescription Act
1617 and now ten years by the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973).
Cases of consolidation indicate the importance of prescription where the right to the
dominium utile was not exercised.19 Failure to use the dominium utile is analogous to
the effect of abandonment.
(b) Abandonment of land was conceptually challenging
The fragmented form of landownership under feudalism was fundamentally different
to the current allodial system.20 No single party was proprietor of all the rights
of ownership in the current sense. Whilst abandonment of moveables was not
conceptually impossible,21 abandonment of landownership could not have been
conceived in the current sense. The feudal ownership of land in a layered system
meant that it was considered in a manner distinct from the ownership of moveables.
Accordingly, the logic of abandonment of moveables could not be applied to the
16 On this, see Craig, Ius Feudale 461, 16, 7.
17 A R G M’Millan, Law of Bona Vacantia in Scotland (1936) 5, discussed in Scottish Coal CSIH para
107. However, the feudal superior may have had a claim in some circumstances: where non-use was
accompanied by non-payment of feu duty, a question of forfeiture might arise: see Gordon and Wortley
(n 9) para 13-19. For completeness sake, in a situation of multiple superiorities it can be surmised that
abandonment by a mid-feudal superior would have led to a similar priority for the Crown over any
other superiors. It can also be observed that complete abandonment by the office of the Crown would
be incompatible with feudalism. Both those situations are beyond the scope of this note.
18 Hay v Paterson 1910 SC 509 at 515 per Lord President Dunedin; Walker v Grieve 1827 5 S 469. See
also K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 97 (written by G L Gretton) and G J
Bell, Prin, 4th edn (1839; reprinted as Old Studies in Scots Law, vol. 1, 2010) §§ 786-805.
19 Wilson v Pollok 1839 2 D 159; Bruce v Carstairs 1770 Mor 10805; Bald v Buchanan 1786 Mor 15084.
20 T B Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 460.
21 As M’Millan put it, when rejecting a reversionary theory of bona vacantia, “moveables are held not in
tenure but in full ownership”: M’Millan, Bona Vacantia (n 17) 3. See also D L Carey Miller with D
Irvine Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) para 2.02 and Lord Advocate v University of
Aberdeen 1963 SC 533.
Vol 22 2018 analysis 305
ownership of land under a feudal system.22 The nearest unilateral action may have
been resignation ad remanentiam. Feudal tenure could be seen as obscuring the
Roman rules which might otherwise have operated.23
(2) Negative value land
The land in Scottish Coal had become a negative value asset due to the costs of
compliance with environmental regulation. Such negative value plots of land would
have been historically anomalous.24 This means positive prescription has a further
relevance to this analysis: prescription would have been more likely to occur where
land was of positive value and thus desirable, again reducing any scope for outright
abandonment. Returning to the present day, Lord Hodge observed this in Scottish
Coal:
At a time when the ownership of land has been become regulated in the public interest
through planning and environmental legislation, it is easy to see why a unilateral power to
abandon land could be abused if it existed.25
With the increased potential for negative value land, it follows that there will be
greater motivation to abandon land.26 For this reason scenarios such as Scottish
Coal are now more likely to arise than would have been the case historically.
It is more difficult to envisage types of land that would have constituted near
permanent negative value assets prior to industrialisation or any other excesses of
the Anthropocene. This, it is submitted, is part of the reason for the lack of cases on
the issue.
E. CONCLUSION
The historic feudal law and the historical rarity of negative value land, which could
combine with the doctrine of positive prescription, offer a plausible explanation
for the absence of Scots law jurisprudence on abandonment. That backdrop might
contribute to the unease which modern Scots law (as reflected in the Inner
House decision) has with land abandonment. In the first edition of their textbook,
written after feudal abolition but pre-Scottish Coal, Gretton and Steven stated that:
22 The Crown right to res nullius under the principle quod nullius est fit domini regis was not a feudal
one. In Scottish Coal CSIH, it was submitted by counsel for one of the successful parties (para 48)
that the Crown right to unowned things “was part of the prerogative right (jus coronae) to the territory
of Scotland”: para 47, with reference to Lord Ross in Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown
Estate Commissioners 1991 SLT 166 at 173.
23 M’Millan, Bona Vacantia (n 17) 7.
24 This is not to say negative value assets are unique to our era: see R Van den Bergh, “Ownership of
agri deserti during the later Roman Empire”, (2004) 67 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse
Reg 60, where the abandonment of agricultural land to avoid high taxes is discussed. Other reasons
mentioned by Van der Bergh include barbarian hordes, exhaustion of soil and shortage of agricultural
labour.
25 Scottish Coal CSOH para 22.
26 Strahilevitz (n 8) 363.
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“Ownership of land is now like the ownership of moveables: ownership in the Roman
sense”.27 If this was the case then it might be presumed that abandonment of land
would follow the same rules as abandonment of moveables. Gordon and Wortley also
presumed this position (also prior to Scottish Coal case).28 This was not the result in
Scottish Coal.29 It now transpires that the abolition of feudal tenure in Scotland has
not given carte blanche for the abandonment of land.
What of the future? With increasing public regulation of land, there will be
conditions in which abandonment will seem the least-worst option, as it was for
the liquidators in Scottish Coal. In certain circumstances the burden of continued
ownership may be almost penal, particularly where an owner has been caught by
changing circumstances and has not contributed to a negative value situation. The
question will then arise as to whether the current rule is fair. There is a separate
question of whether the rule leads to efficient allocation of resources across society.
There may be follow-on questions about what steps might be taken to mitigate
a blanket prohibition of abandonment, perhaps by offering a mechanism to ease
transfer to another party (assuming a willing transferee can be found) or offering a
means for another party to acquire ownership other than the existing rules of positive
prescription. Abandonment of heritable property raises many yet-to-be-determined
conceptual and practical points. The relatively recent abolition of feudalism coupled
with emerging public regulation of land and indeed Scotland’s wider land reform
agenda provide an ideal opportunity to consider how to address land abandonment in
a way that is suitable for modern Scotland. Further comment should be anticipated
and could yet form the basis of another note.
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27 G L Gretton and A J M Steven, Property, Trusts and Succession, (2008) 463. This was retained in the
second edition (485) and in the third edition (504) notwithstanding the Scottish Coal case.
28 Gordon & Wortley, Scottish Land Law (n 9) para 13.20.
29 In a passing and suitably caveated comment on whether landownership can be abandoned, Professors
Reid and Gretton stressed they offered no view on the “difficult” issues involved, but took the
opportunity to observe “in general in private law rights may be given up, so that if ownership of land
cannot be abandoned, the result is asymmetrical”: Conveyancing 2013 (n 9) 197.
